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ABSTRACT  
This chapter discusses how experimental research using implicit visual cues can offer 
unique insights into the nature and consequences of territorial attachments in multi-
level polities such as the European Union; how exposure to threat might impact on 
attitudes to the European Union; and how recent empirical efforts to illustrate the 
interaction of these two effects ± exposure to visual stimuli and threat ± point to a new 
research direction for students of European identity.  The conclusion proposes 
empirical applications that extend recent research.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Continued UK membership of the European Union (EU) increasingly appears to be 
under threat. A traditionally Eurosceptic nation, where even the presence of the EU 
flag in government buildings is a matter of controversy, Britain has exhibited 
consistently low levels of attachment to the EU in crossnational opinion surveys. 
Prime Minister Cameron has promised that in the event of a Conservative victory in 
2015, he will hold a referendum on continued EU membership of his country. At the 
same time, the UK Independence Party (UKIP), an avowedly Eurosceptic party, 
gained an unprecedented 24 seats - RQHWKLUGRIWKH8.¶VVHDWV- at the European 
Parliament elections of 2014.  
 
Yet, the most recent polls at the time of writing show support for EU membership in 
the UK to be peaking at its highest level in more than two decades (for example, 
IPSOS MORI Political Monitor, October 2014). This poses a crucial dilemma to any 
vote-seeking political actor with Eurosceptic aspirations: how much does one move in 
the direction of proposing an anti-EU vision to a relatively Eurosceptic public, before 
one triggers a Europhilic backlash among the same public? Understanding how 
individual attachment to the EU is shaped and how context interacts with and impacts 
on that attachment are matters of considerable contemporary interest.  
 
This chapter discusses the following:  
(i) How experimental research using implicit contextual stimuli (group symbols) 
that can activate group attachments offers insights into territorial attachment in 
multi-level polities such as the EU; 
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(ii) How threat contexts might be expected to impact on attitudes to the European 
Union; 
(iii) Recent attempts to measure the effect of exposure to threat and EU symbols on 
related attachments and preferences; 
(iv) Proposed empirical applications that can extend the insights of current research. 
 
Drawing on recent experimental studies, we argue that when presented in a context 
that implies even a subtle threat to the benefits of EU membership, EU symbols stop 
signifying the ³them´ to the national ³us´. Instead, they become symbols of a familiar 
status quo, which citizens are less willing to relinquish. The arguments and findings 
reviewed in this chapter are consistent with the recent upsurge in UK public support 
for continued EU membership, at a point at which the threat of exit has become an 
existential reality. The conclusion proposes ways in which the present research 
agenda can be enriched.   
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section reviews recent experimental 
research on the psychology of group attachments, which employs implicit visual cues 
to examine the nature and impact of such attachments. This is followed by discussions 
of the instrumental connotations of group-related visual cues, and of the role of threat 
in fostering a fondness for the status quo as a coping mechanism to combat 
psychological stress. It is argued that this mechanism may lead to stronger ³we-
feelings´ where previously these were absent or weak. Next, we review recent 
findings from experimental studies that manipulate individual exposure to EU 
symbols and threat in the field of EU identity studies. The conclusion proposes further 
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experimental research that brings the field closer to actually measuring revealed rather 
than expressed (survey-based) outcomes. 
 
SYMBOLS AND GROUP ATTACHMENTS  
 
Identity processes - their formation, presence and consequences - are complex 
processes that are not easily expressed verbally. They entail a variety of social-
psychological components, which include (Abdelal et al. 2009): 
 
 The objective categories of group membership that individuals use to define 
their self-image 
 The cognitive and affective commitment of individuals to these categories  
 Relative comparisons: positive attributes (stereotypes) attached to typical 
bearers of these categories; negative attributes attached to non-bearers  
 Norms, symbols and social purposes attached to these categories 
 
Despite the complex nature of the identity phenomenon, most existing methodological 
approaches to the study of group identity and attachment, in the EU context and 
elsewhere, rely exclusively on self-reported, verbal measures. In effect, researchers 
ask respondents directly to report ± and, therefore, to rationalise about - their 
identities, motivations and preferences. Some type of correlational analysis is then 
employed to detect systematic patterns in the data.  
 
In our research so far, we have used a more implicit strategy to measure EU 
attachment and its consequences. The implicit nature of this research draws on 
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seminal conceptualisations of identity as banal and routine (Billig 1995). These have 
been applied recently to the study of EU identity, with an emphasis on how citizens 
are subjected to daily, subtle reminders of their involvement in the larger European 
Union system (Cram 2001, 2006, 2012; Manners 2011). These reminders do not have 
a ³hot´ or heroic form ± an anthem, a map or a flag per se - but appear in 
unremarkable contexts (passports, currency, driving licences, and license plates). Still, 
these contexts remind citizens of their involvement in the EU system whether they 
favour or oppose that system.  
 
The implicit character of these reminders dovetails with a key finding of recent 
empirical studies; namely, that a range of social-psychological phenomena ± 
including behaviours, attitudes and attachments ± UHVWRQDXWRPDWLFRU³JXW´UHDFWLRQV
that may bypass cognitive awareness (for example, see an overview of research in 
social cognition in Hassin et al. 2005). In influential contributions, Hassin et al. 
(2007, 2009) primed identity processes among respondents by exposing them visually 
to national flags. Exposure to these cues interacted with existing attachment to affect 
relevant responses (see also Butz et al. 2007).  
 
In particular, Hassin et al. (2009) found that subliminal exposure to the Israeli 
national flag had a homogenising effect on the political attitudes of individuals at 
extreme ends of the Israeli nationalist spectrum. Implicit priming with national flags 
affected both the stated voting intentions as well as the actual voting practice of 
participants in general elections (Hassin et al. 2009). In the United States, implicit 
exposure to the confederate flag significantly decreased the willingness of participants 
to vote for Barack Obama (Ehrlinger et al. 2011). Of particular relevance is the 
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finding that implicit exposure to national symbols can enhance a sense of national 
identification and promote group belonging at an unconscious level, with associated 
effects on attitudes and behaviours (Butz 2009: 779).  
 
The potential of the EU flag to promote a convergence in attitudes in the various 
PHPEHUVWDWHVLVDWWKHKHDUWRIPDQ\(8LQLWLDWLYHVWRSURPRWHD³3HRSOHV¶(XURSH´
However, it has also been demonstrated experimentally that the impact of national 
state symbols may have a polarising impact depending on existing attachments. 
Drawing on social identification theory, Gilboa and Bodner (2009: 19) found that in 
the Israeli context adolescents, immigrants and particularly the ultra-religious were 
less likely to identify strong national associations with their national anthem. These 
LQVLJKWVDUHVXSSRUWHGE\%XW]¶VUHPLQGHURIWKHPXOWL-referential nature of 
national symbols and of the ability of such symbols to provoke polarisation as well as 
convergence. 6DFKV¶VVWXG\RIQDWLRQDODQG,VODPLFLGHQWLWLHVLQ,QGRQHVLDDOVR
revealed the capacity of national symbols to provoke disunity and specifically to 
invoke discord amongst groups that felt disadvantaged within the national context.  
 
SYMBOLS AND INSTRUMENTAL BENEFITS 
 
The attachment of symbols to instrumental benefits is an essential part of the creation 
and maintenance of a sense of identification with a political regime. Benefits of 
regime membership, whether material or otherwise, can become associated with 
symbols denoting attachment such as flags and national anthems. These symbols, over 
time, begin to function as a cognitive short cut. As the symbols begin to resonate with 
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the public, even at an unconscious level, they become capable of mobilising 
³national´, or in this case, ³EU´ sentiment.  
 
Deutsch (1966:172-173) argued early on that, in order to understand the process of 
identity building, we needed to study the secondary symbols that carry implicit 
messages about nationhood. The extent to which these secondary symbols had 
become attached to daily events and patterns of communication is of particular 
interest. Deutsch, thus, argued that a detailed mapping exercise of national symbols 
and their functions was required. Billig (1995: 175), referring to the nation state, also 
argued that there was a need for a taxonomy of national ³flaggings´.  
 
Symbols appear to play an important role in forging a European Union identity (Shore 
1993; Laffan 1996; Bruter 2003, 2009; McLaren 2006; Manners 2011). Certainly, the 
EU institutions have employed considerable resources in an attempt to generate 
meaningful EU symbols that resonate with national publics. However, there is still 
much to learn about how the EU symbol impacts, in practice, on attitudes and 
behaviours in the various member-states and even beyond. A question of particular 
interest is whether and to what extent the context in which the EU symbol is displayed 
can shape mass attitudes.  
 
Key to understanding the process of European Union identity formation is an 
appreciation of the nature and complexities of the relationship between European 
Union identity and the range of national state identities and sub-state national 
identities with which it interacts. National identity is not contiguous with member 
state borders. The EU as an institution provides a context within which calculations as 
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to the contingent benefits of affiliation with any given level of administration are 
made. In the multi-level and multi-national system of the EU, the processes through 
which existing and emerging identities interact, and how the EU institutional structure 
and external contexts impact upon this process, require detailed analysis.  
 
As Butz argues (2009: µSDUWLFXODUW\SHVRIDVVRFLDWLRQVPD\EHDFWLYDWHGDQG
EHFRPHLQIOXHQWLDOLQGLIIHUHQWFRQWH[WVDQGVLWXDWLRQV¶6DFKVFDXWLRQV
political entrepreneurs that attempts to promote national unity through explicit 
attempts at identity manipulation may diverge significantly from their initial 
intentions. This caution is particularly relevant for the complex EU context with 
respect to explicit top-down exercises of identity building.  
 
SYMBOLS UNDER THREAT 
 
As the recent UK case suggests, the instrumental benefits associated with identity 
SURFHVVHVIRUH[DPSOHDFRXQWU\¶VPHPEHUVKLSRIWKH(8FDQFRPHXQGHUWKUHDW
The presence of threat has cognitive, behavioural and motivational effects for 
individuals and groups (Jost et al. 2003; Thorisdottir/Jost 2011; Pantoja/Segura 2012). 
These effects are predominantly in a direction that favours the status quo, in an 
attempt to manage uncertainty. It KDVEHHQDUJXHGIRUH[DPSOHWKDWµWKHUHPD\EHD
general tendency for individuals, groups, and organisations to behave rigidly in 
WKUHDWHQLQJVLWXDWLRQV¶(Staw et al. 2007: 502). Lavine et al. (2005: 221) also suggest 
WKDWWKUHDWµSURYLGHVWKHSULPDU\PRWLYDWLRQIRUWKHLQWHUQDOLsDWLRQRIVRFLHW\¶V
prescriptions (conventionalism), submission to perceived legitimate authority, and 
aggression against out-JURXSV¶ They argue that the presence of threat alters not only 
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what authoritarians think, but how they think, and find that threat increases the extent 
to which authoritarians act in line with their existing predispositions and encourages 
high authoritarians towards biased, rather than open-minded, information processing 
(Lavine et al. 2005: 240). Perrin (2005) confirms the link between conservative 
authoritarian attitudes and  the experience of threat. Pantoja and Segura (2012) 
provide evidence that a threatening context, in their case a threatening environment 
for Latinos in California, has consequences for the process of learning and political 
information gathering. Specifically, immigrants in California are motivated by a 
hostile context to become more knowledgeable for the purpose of political self-
defence. 
 
Threat is also known to hold a central role in influencing inter-group relations. It 
plays a key part in shaping and consolidating a sense of ³us´ and ³them´. Early 
VWXGLHVRILQWHUJURXSFRQIOLFWLQER\V¶FDPSV, for instance, identified the significant 
role played by external threat in creating internal group cohesion (Sherif/Sherif 1953; 
Sherif et al. 1961). External threats have more generally been shown to draw group 
members closer together and to strengthen in-group cohesiveness (Staw et al. 2007: 
507).   
 
Deutsch et al. (1957) have theorised about the process in which emerging patterns of 
attachment to a political unit are consolidated once the benefits associated with that 
unit come under risk (see also Cram 2012). This expectation also dovetails with 
:OH]LHQ¶V³WKHUPRVWDWLF´YLHZRIWKHUHVSRQVLYHQHVVRISXEOLFRSLQLRQWRHOLWH
initiatives (Wlezien 1995). Franklin and Wlezien (1997) have applied this model to 
study the link between the volume of EU integration policies and public preferences 
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on integration. They find that when Brussels policies moved too much in the direction 
of integration the public adjusted its preferences to the opposite direction asking for 
less integration. The operation of this negative feedback mechanism depends on 
whether the EU issue is salient or not.   
 
These points are applicable in the context of EU attachment. The UK example is a 
helpful illustration. When the element of threat is not prominent, in what could be 
described as normal political circumstances, the EU system exists as WKH³RWKHU´WRWKH
UK ³XV´. The reasons for the negative, relative to other large European nations, 
stance of the British public and their political elites on the EU can be explained on the 
basis of instrumental, economic considerations and national identity concerns. 
However, wKHQWKH(8V\VWHPDQG%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQLWFRPHXQGHUWKUHDWDVLQWKH
recent case, thH(8PLJKWEHUHJDUGHGDVWKH³XV´WRDQXQGHILQHG³WKHP´ 
 
AN EXPERIMENTAL ILLUSTRATION 
 
In our earlier research we examined the effect of implicit exposure to the EU symbol 
(Cram/Patrikios 2015; see the Appendix for a summary of the research design). This 
was achieved by exposing participants to photographic images that had been 
manipulated to include or exclude the EU symbol. The measurement of the relevant 
preferences and other personal characteristics was administered by a short 
questionnaire that followed exposure. The symbol was only part of a larger scene and 
not the main focus of the image. This work used British public opinion data collected 
in online survey experiments, and established that the underlying identity processes 
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that linked exposure to the symbol and related opinions were of a functional, ³EDQDO´
nature (Billig 1995).  
 
Specifically, we found that implicitly exposing participants to the EU symbol in an 
instrumental setting (photo of passport control checkpoint at airport), and not in the 
abstract, had an impact on their opinions regarding the practical benefits of the EU. 
The way this implicit effect operated reinforced pre-existing feelings of attachment to 
the EU in a polarising way; specifically, those attached to the EU reacted to the EU 
symbol by providing more pro-EU responses than the control group; those not 
attached to the EU reacted to the EU symbol by providing more anti-EU responses 
than the control group. 
 
Our more recent work (Patrikios/Cram, forthcoming; see the Appendix) used a small 
Scottish student sample to establish what would happen to the instrumental 
connection described if placed under threat. Threat was introduced as a subtle textual 
manipulation. In detail, participants were asked to complete a short survey 
questionnaire with a front page that combined image and text, plus instructions. There 
were four possible combinations. The page combined versions of a photographic 
image (airport passport checkpoint with or without the EU symbol) with an excerpt 
from a mock news story. The story ZDVZRUGHGZLWKRXWDQ\PHQWLRQRIWKH³(8´RU
³(XURSH´RUQDWLRQDOUHIHUHQWV, but made reference to D³WHUURUWKUHDWGLVUXSWLQJWUDYHO
SODQV´ or had a neutral content for the control group. We found that exposure to the 
EU symbol produce more positive responses towards the EU only when presented 
within a threatening context. 
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CONCLUSION AND A RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
The chapter reviewed recent empirical attempts to measure the impact of threat 
exposure on EU attachment in an implicit manner, one that JDXJHV³JXW´UHDFWLRQV
and bypasses the biases of the standard measurement strategies relying on self-
reports. The experimental strategy presented so far relies on the implicit exposure of 
individuals to implicit threat cues UHODWHGWRSUDFWLFDOEHQHILWVRIWKHLUFRXQWU\¶V
membership to the EU. The benefits are focused on the ease of movement across the 
EU. Threat exposure is accompanied by subtle exposure to a key EU symbol. Both 
these elements, implicit threat and visual cue, create a situation where individual 
respondents are primed to consider the potential risks to the practical benefits of EU 
membership for their country. The consequences of this priming are positive for EU 
attachments and preferences.  
 
Measuring these consequences would have been very difficult had we only relied on 
self-reported measures; for instance, if we simply asked respondents about their 
attachments, their EU-related opinions, and made the threat to the EU explicit as part 
of question wording (e.g. as an opening statement). That would inevitably trigger 
known desirability biases, where respondents would be aware of what answers are 
³H[SHFWHG´RIWKHP8.,3VXSSRUWHUVIRUexample, would be tempted to provide 
negative opinions on the EU irrespective of contextual manipulation. The use of 
implicit cues helps us bypass some of these biases.  
 
However, our approach does not take us as far away from these biases as we might 
want to go. We still have to rely on expressed consequences of our experimental 
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manipulation, as we use self-reports of EU-related preferences and attachments. A 
range of game-theoretic paradigms previously used in economics, psychology, and 
political science would permit the measurement of revealed preferences. These are 
ideal for avoiding the losses to validity that come with verbal measures. We review 
two applications in this final section.  
 
Instead of asking respondents to answer a survey question as a measure of their EU-
related opinions, a ³dictator´ game would ask participants to divide a sum of money 
between themselves and some anonymous recipient, as they saw fit (for example, 
Forsythe et al. 1994; Hoffman et al. 1994; Fowler/Kam 2007). Contrary to the 
expectations of traditional rational choice theory, individuals usually share an amount 
of the initial sum with anonymous recipients. In this version, a subject acting as the 
dictator will have either no visual information about the recipient (control condition) 
RULQIRUPDWLRQDVWRUHFLSLHQW¶VJURXSPHPEHUship (a flag that reveals EU or other 
group membership). The game would shed light on the impact of EU-related cues on 
other-regarding behaviour, solidarity and generosity between EU member states. We 
expect that exposure to the EU cue (compared to exposure to the control cue or even 
some national cue) would lead to different allocation distributions.  
 
In another application, research could use the ³stag hunt´ game in which participants 
must choose between cooperating with the other player to hunt a riskier, but more 
valuable payoff or to go it alone for a surer, less valuable result (for example, see 
Battalio et al. 2001). Again, implicit visual cues could be used to specify the other 
SOD\HU¶VJURXSFRQWURO(8RUQDWLRQDO7KHH[SHFWDWLRQLV that EU primed subjects 
may show higher levels of cooperation than control subjects, but maybe lower than 
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national primed subjects. Apart from incorporating the threat element in the form of 
financial loss, this game provides a more robust tool for examining the impact of 
identity on behaviour, as researchers can manipulate the payoff function (risk vs. 
reward) parametrically and determine critical ranges of values for cooperation as a 
function of implicit identity-related processes. 
 
These applications would help students of EU identity to measure behavioural - and 
not self-reported behavioural - consequences of exposure to related visual cues under 
threat in a way that would entirely bypass desirability biases that affect the 
psychology of survey response. The applications can provide a potentially rich source 
of information, which addresses the impact of identity on politically relevant 
behaviour (generosity, cooperation, and trust). They allow for the assessment of 
identity as fundamentally affective or rational by whether or not it promotes rational 
or non-rational behaviour in games where such behaviour is well defined and 
measured.  
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APPENDIX 
 
A1. Experiment details (Cram/Patrikios 2015) 
The research was conducted online with UK territorial samples. Respondents were 
exposed to an implicit visual cue related to the EU (the control group did not receive 
the EU cue) in the form of either a flag decorating a public building or the EU symbol 
at passport control. The image appeared as the introduction screen to the survey. The 
short survey asked questions about EU-related attitudes and preferences, which were 
replicated from Eurobarometer surveys. The responses of participants exposed to the 
EU related image were compared to the responses of control participants, which were 
not exposed to the EU symbol. For further details and visual aids, see Cram and 
Patrikios (2015). 
 
 
A2. Experiment details (Patrikios/Cram, forthcoming) 
The research team placed four versions of a printed questionnaire face-down in 
separate sections of the lecture theatre. Each of the four versions contained a different 
cover page, which combined the visual and textual manipulations (2×2). The short 
survey attached to the cover page was identical across the four versions. Each version 
of the questionnaire corresponded to a different section of the lecture theatre. The 
sections were separated from each other. Students were randomly assigned to one of 
the four sections upon arrival in class, and were asked only to first read the cover page 
very carefully, and then to complete the short survey. For further details and visual 
aids, see Patrikios and Cram (forthcoming). 
